We study the evolution of cooperation in an interacting particle system with two types. The model we investigate is an extension of a two-type biased voter model. One type (called defector) has a (positive) bias α with respect to the other type (called cooperator). However, a cooperator helps a neighbor (either defector or cooperator) to reproduce at rate γ. We prove that the one-dimensional nearest-neighbor interacting dynamical system exhibits a phase transition at α = γ. A special choice of interaction kernels yield that for α > γ cooperators always die out, but if γ > α, cooperation is the winning strategy.
Introduction
In nature cooperative behavior amongst individuals is widely spread. It is observed in animals, e.g. [Clu09, GW03] , as well as in microorganisms, e.g. [Cre01, WL06] . In the attempt to understand this phenomenon by models, theoretical approaches introduced different interpretations and forms of cooperation, mostly within the area of game theory [Now06] . In all such approaches, a defector (or selfish) type tends to have more offspring, but there are cases when it is outcompeted by the cooperator type under some circumstances. Although in all of the models describing cooperation the question of extinction and survival of a type or the coexistence of several types are main subjects of the mathematical analysis, the frameworks for the theoretical studies may vary. While (stochastic) differential equations are mainly used for non-spatial systems (see for example [AS12, HJM15+] ), the theory of interacting particle systems provides a suitable setup for the analysis of models with local interactions between the particles, [BK11, EL16, SS15] . In this paper we define a model using the latter structure and terminology.
Investigations of models incorporating cooperation are interesting because of the following dichotomy: in non-spatial (well-mixed) situations, the whole population benefits from the cooperative behavior. If defectors have a higher fitness than cooperators, defectors always outcompete cooperators in the long run. However, if the system is truly spatial, cooperators can form clusters and then use their cooperative behavior in order to defend themselves against defectors, even though those might have higher (individual) fitness. This heuristics suggests that only structured models can help to understand cooperative behavior in nature. For the model studied in the present paper, we will make it precise in Proposition 2.6 for 
The model
Let V be a countable vertex set, and (a(u, v)) u,v∈V be a (not necessarily symmetric) Markov kernel from V to V . Additionally, (b(u, (v, w)) u∈V,(v,w)∈V ×V is a second Markov kernel from V to V × V . We study an interacting particle system X = ((X t (u)) u∈V ) t≥0 with state space {0, 1} V , where X t (u) ∈ {0, 1} is the type at site u at time t. A particle in state 0 is called defector and a particle in state 1 is called cooperator. The dynamics of the interacting particle system, which is a Markov process, is (informally) as follows: For some α, γ ≥ 0:
• Reproduction: A particle at site u ∈ V reproduces with rate a(u, v) to site v, i.e. X (v) changes to X(u). (This mechanism is well-known from the voter model.)
• Selection: If X(u) = 0 (i.e. there is a defector at site u ∈ V ), it reproduces with additional rate α a(u, v) to site v, i.e. X(v) changes to 0. (A defector has a fitness advantage over the cooperators by this additional chance to reproduce. This mechanism is well-known from the biased voter model.)
• Cooperation: If X(u) = 1 (i.e. there is a cooperator at site u ∈ V ), the individual at site v (no matter which state it has) reproduces to site w at rate γ b(u, (v, w)) ≥ 0. (A cooperator at site u helps an individual at site v to reproduce to site w.)
Remark 2.1 (Interpretation). 1. Selection: Since cooperation imposes an energetic cost on cooperators, the non-cooperating individuals can use these free resources for reproduction processes. This leads to a fitness advantage which we describe with the parameter α.
Cooperation:
The idea of the cooperation mechanism in our model is that each cooperator supports a neighboring individual, independent of its type, to reproduce to another site according to the Markov kernel b. A biological interpretation for this supportive interaction is a common good produced by cooperators and released to the environment helping the colony to expand. The corresponding interaction parameter is γ. Below, we will deal with two situations, depending on whether b(u, (v, u)) > 0 or b(u, (v, u)) = 0. In the former case, we speak of an altruistic system, since a cooperator at site u can help the particle at site v to kill it. In the latter case, we speak of a cooperative system.
In order to uniquely define a Markov process, we will need the following assumption.
Assumption 2.2 (Markov kernels). The Markov kernels a(., .) and b(., (., .)) satisfy
Remark 2.3 (Some special cases). A special case is
Then, (2.2) is implied by the assumption
which is stronger than (2.1). We will also deal with a similar case setting b(u, (v, u)) = 0 which means that u cannot help v to replace u.
To be more precise, we set
The normalizing sum in the denominator emerges from the exclusion of self-replacement, i.e. (2.4) is the two-step transition kernel of a self-avoiding random walk.
Existence and uniqueness of the process
We now become more formal and define the (pre-)generator of the process X via its transition rates. Given X ∈ {0, 1} V , the rate of change c(u, X) from X to
is as follows:
Here, the first sum in c(u, X) represents the rates triggered by reproduction and selection whereas the last terms emerge from the cooperation mechanism. The existence of a unique Markov process corresponding to the transition rates c(u, X) satisfying Assumption 2.2 is guaranteed by standard theory, see for example [Lig85, Chapter 1]. Precisely, we define the (pre-)generator Ω of the process through
where f ∈ D(Ω), the domain of Ω, is given by D(Ω) := {f : {0, 1} V → R depends only on finitely many coordinates}.
We note that D(Ω) is dense in C b ({0, 1} V ), the set of bounded continuous functions on {0, 1} V , because of the Stone-Weierstrass-Theorem. We find the following general statement.
Proposition 2.4 (Existence of unique Markov process). If Assumption 2.2 holds, the transition rates c(., .) given in (2.5) and (2.6) define a unique Markov process X on {0, 1} V . Moreover, the closureΩ of Ω is the generator of X.
Proof. We need to show that the closure of Ω in C({0, 1} V ) is a generator of a semi-group which then uniquely defines a Markov process (see for example [Lig85, Theorem 1.1.5]). In order to show this we follow [Lig85, Theorem 1.3.9] and check the following two conditions:
where
measures the dependence of the transition rate c(u, X) of the site v ∈ V and · T denotes the total variation norm. Both inequalities follow from Assumption 2.2 and the definition of the transition rates c(., .). Using these we obtain for any X ∈ {0, 1} V and u ∈ V c(u, X)
where we used the inequalities (2.1) and (2.2) again and we have proved (2.8).
Now, using [Lig85, Theorem 1.3.9] we see that the closure of Ω in C({0, 1} V ) is a Markov generator of a Markov semigroup. This finishes the proof.
We can now define the voter model with bias and cooperation.
Definition 2.5 ((Cooperative/Altruistic) Voter Model with Bias and Cooperation). Let a(., .) be a Markov kernel from V to V satisfying (2.1) and b(., (., .)) be a Markov kernel from V to V × V satisfying (2.2).
Unstructured populations
As a first result, we show that the probability for cooperators to die out on a large, complete graph tends to one (for α > 0). We consider the special case of an unstructured population. Therefore, let V N be the vertex set of a graph with |V N | = N and
Due to the global neighborhood it is equally likely to find configurations of the form "101" and "110". Hence, cooperation events favoring a defector or a cooperator happen with the same rate and thus cancel out when looking at the mean field behavior of the system. We will show that defectors always take over the system for large N . It can easily be seen that the aVMBC is dominated by the cVMBC, so it suffices to show extinction of cooperators for the cVMBC, i.e. we have
We prove that in the limit for large N the frequency of cooperators follows a logistic equation with negative drift, hence cooperators die out. See also [EK86, Chapter 11].
Proposition 2.6 (Convergence in the unstructured case). Let X N be a cVMBC on V N and
where S solves the ODE dS = −αS(1 − S)
Proof. In order to prove the limiting behavior for N → ∞, we observe that S N is a Markov process. A calculation of the generator Ω N applied to some smooth function f yields
Applying standard weak convergence results, see for example [EK86, Theorem 4.8.2], this shows the claimed convergence.
3 Results on the long-time behavior for V = Z d Our main goal is to derive the long-time behavior of the VMBC with V = Z d . In spin-flip systems, results on the ergodic behavior can be obtained by general principles if the process is attractive. Thereby, a spin-system is called attractive if for two configurations X, Y ∈ {0, 1} V with X ≤ Y componentwise, the corresponding transition rates c satisfy the following two relations for all u ∈ V
However, the VMBC is not attractive for γ > 0. Indeed, consider the simple case when V = {u, v, w} with Markov kernels
This shows that (3.2) is not satisfied at w ∈ V . Hence, proofs for the long-time behavior require other strategies which do not rely on attractiveness of the process. Before we state our main results we define what we mean by extinction and clustering.
Definition 3.1 (Extinction, clustering). 1. We say that in the VMBC-process (X t ) t≥0 type i ∈ {0, 1} dies out if
2. We say that the VMBC-process clusters if for all u, v ∈ V
We will use V = Z d and nearest neighbor interaction via the kernels a and b. In this case we have that for all u, v, w ∈ Z d with |u − v| = |w − v| = 1
for the aVMBC and
for the cVMBC. We say that (the distribution of) a {0, 1} Z d -valued random configuration X is non-trivial if P (X(u) = 0 for all u), P (X(u) = 1 for all u) < 1. Furthermore, we call X trans-
. If the VMBC model is started in a translation invariant configuration X 0 ∈ {0, 1} Z d , the configuration X t is translation invariant due to the homogeneous model dynamics. Now we can state our main results. For cVMBC, we distinguish between the case α > γ where we can state a convergence result in all dimensions d ≥ 1, the case γ > α and the case γ = α. In the last two cases, the method of proof is only applicable in dimension d = 1.
Figure 1: Relative frequencies of cooperators after 100, 000 transitions of the cVMBC on a 1, 000 sites torus in one dimension (dashed line), a 40 × 40 sites torus in two dimensions (solid line) and a 12 × 12 × 12 sites torus in three dimensions (dotted line). The initial configuration was a Bernoulli-product measure with probability 0.5 and the selection rate α was set to 0.5. We suspect that the slightly smaller slope in three dimensions is a finite-number effect.
Theorem 1 (cVMBC-limits). Let V = Z d and a(., .) be the nearest neighbor random walk kernel and X be the cVMBC with α, γ ≥ 0 starting in some non-trivial translation invariant configuration.
(i) If d ≥ 1 and α > γ, the cooperators die out.
(ii) If d = 1 and γ > α, the defectors die out.
(iii) If d = 1 and γ = α, the process clusters.
The proof of Theorem 1 can be found in Section 6.1. Briefly, for α > γ, we will use a comparison argument with a biased voter model, see Definition 5.1. For γ > α and d = 1, however, we prove the convergence result with the help of a clustersize-process which takes the special form of a one-dimensional jump process. As we will see, for γ > α, a cluster of cooperators has a positive probability to survive and expand to infinity which will then yield the result. Unfortunately, due to the simple description of such a cluster in one dimension, this argument cannot be extended to higher dimensions. However, resorting to some simulation results for d = 2 and d = 3, we see a similar behavior (with a different threshold) like in d = 1, see Figure 1 . For higher dimensions, spatial correlations between sites are weaker reducing the impact of clusters on the evolution of the system. This in turn leads to a reduced chance of survival of cooperators. For the aVMBC, we can only state a threshold when cooperators die out.
Theorem 2 (aVMBC-limits). Let V = Z d and a(., .) be the nearest neighbor random walk kernel and X be the aVMBC with α, γ ≥ 0 starting in some non-trivial translation invariant configuration. (ii) If d = 1, the process equals the cVMBC with parameters α+γ/2 and γ/2 in distribution.
In particular, if γ > α = 0, the process clusters.
The proof of the Theorem can be found in Section 6.2. Again, for α > γ(d − PF10] for an overview. As to the theoretical behavior of the model this changes the transition rate in (2.6), i.e. if X(u) = 1 then
Here, cooperators are less likely to die and hence, this process dominates the cVMBC. In particular, for translation invariant initial conditions, defectors die out for γ > α in one dimension. Moreover, as can be seen from a calculation similar as in the proof of Lemma 5.3, a biased voter model, where type 0 is favored, still dominates this process for α > γ. Hence, we also have that cooperators die out in this case and the same results as in Theorem 1 hold.
Since cooperators always die out in d = 1 for the aVMBC (as long as α > 0), we focus on the cVMBC in the sequel. We state some results if the starting configuration is not translation invariant, but contains only a finite number of cooperators or defectors.
Theorem 3 (Finite initial configurations). Let V = Z and a(., .) be the nearest neighbor random walk kernel and X be the cVMBC with α, γ ≥ 0. Let X 0 contain either finitely many defectors or finitely many cooperators (i.e. X 0 = 1 A or X 0 = 1 − 1 A for some finite A ⊆ V ).
(i) The process clusters.
(ii) If α ≥ γ and X 0 contains finitely many cooperators, the cooperators die out.
(iii) If γ ≥ α and X 0 contains finitely many defectors, the defectors die out.
Remark 3.3 (Starting with a single particle). A particularly simple initial condition is given if |A| = 1. In case there is initially only a single cooperator, we note that the size of the cluster of cooperators (C t ) t≥0 is a birth-death process which jumps from C to C + 1 at rate 1 {C>0} + γ · 1 {C≥2} , C − 1 at rate (1 + α) · 1 {C>0} .
Conversely, if there is only a single defector, the size of the cluster of defectors (D t ) t≥0 is a birth-death process which jumps from D to
Hence, either cooperators or defectors die out, depending on whether (C t ) t≥0 (or (D t ) t≥0 ) hits 0 or not.
The proof of Theorem 3 is given in Section 6.3. Note that the only situations where the process does not converge to a deterministic configuration in this setting are the cases where γ > α (α > γ) and the process starts with finitely many cooperators (defectors). Here, the limit distribution is a linear combination of the invariant measures δ 0 and δ 1 , the all-zero and all-one configuration, respectively. This basically means that we observe clustering, which is statement (i) above.
Comparison to results from [BK11] and [EL16]
In this section we compare our results on the cVMBC to those obtained by Blath and Kurt in [BK11] and the system introduced by Evilsizor and Lanchier in [EL16] . We choose these two models since both have mechanisms favoring one type, while a second type is only favored if it occurs in a cluster.
Comparison to [BK11]
One model studied is the cooperative caring double-branching annihilating random walk (ccD-BARW) on the integer lattice Z. Particles migrate to neighboring sites with rate m and annihilate when meeting another particle. (Note that this mechanism favors the unoccupied state.) The double-branching events happen with rate 1 − m. Here, the authors restrict branching to particles with an occupied neighboring site and such particles branch to the next unoccupied site to the left and to the right. (That is, if a cluster of size ≥ 2 already exists, the branching mechanism extends the cluster.) Their result about this process, starting in a finite configuration (see Theorem 2.4 in the paper), states that for m < 1/2, particles survive with positive probability, whereas for m > 2/3, particles die out almost surely.
Although Blath and Kurt only discuss the case of a finite initial configuration, the results are in line with our findings: If the mechanism to favor enlargement of existing clusters (cooperation in our case and cooperative branching in their case) is too weak, type 0 (or the unoccupied state) wins. Importantly, in both models, enlargement of existing clusters can be strong enough in order to outcompete the beneficial (or unoccupied) type.
Comparison to [EL16]
The model studied in [EL16] -called the death-birth updating process -emerges from a game theoretic model with two strategies. This means that transition rates are derived from a 2 × 2 payoff-matrix with entries a ij for i, j ∈ {1, 2} representing the payoff obtained by a particle of type i due to interacting with a particle of type j. Now, a particle dies with rate 1 and is replaced by a particle in its neighborhood proportionally to its fitness which is determined by the values of the payoff-matrix. The neighborhood is given by blocks of radius R. The authors analyze this model in different settings. They call a strategy i selfish if a ii > a ji for j = i (i.e. the payoff having strategy i as opponent is bigger if one has the same strategy i) and altruistic if a ii < a ji . Again, in a non-spatial version of this game, selfish strategies always outcompete altruistic strategies. Noting that selfish strategies seem to be fitter, altruistic strategies might become favorable if they form a big cluster because altruists might have a high payoff. As the results in [EL16] show (see their Figure 2 ), there are parameter regions -in particular in a spatial Prisoner's dilemma -where altruists can outcompete selfish strategies.
Clearly, the cVMBC is a much simpler model than the death-birth updating process. This is resembled in the results, since [EL16] show parameter combinations with coexistence for the death-birth updating process, but our results never show coexistence for the cVMBC. However, as in our findings for the cVMBC, [EL16] find that types unfavorable in a nonspatial context can indeed win in all dimensions. Unfortunately, they can only give bounds on the phase transition in their model, while we have seen that α = γ is a sharp threshold, at least in one dimension.
Preliminaries
Here we provide some useful results for the proofs of our theorems. In particular, we provide a comparison with a biased voter model in Section 5.1 and a particular jump process in Section 5.2.
Comparison results
In cases where α > γ, it is possible to prove a stochastic domination of the VMBC by a biased voter model. The precise statements will be given below. But first, we define this process, which was introduced by Williams and Bjerknes in [WB71] and first studied by Bramson and Griffeath in [BG81] .
Definition 5.1 (Biased Voter Model). The biased voter model with bias β ≥ −1 and δ ≥ −1 is a spin system X with state space {0, 1} V and transition rates as follows:
Remark 5.2 (Long-time behavior of the biased voter model). The long-time behavior of the biased voter model is quite simple. In [BG81] , the limit behavior of the biased voter model in V = Z d with nearest neighbor interactions is studied. Generalizations to the case of d−regular trees for d ≥ 3 can be found in [LTV14] . We restate the results for V = Z d : Let X be a biased voter model with bias β > −1 and δ > −1 as introduced in Definition 5.1. For any configuration X 0 ∈ {0, 1} Z d with infinitely particles of each type it holds that the type with less bias dies out, i.e.:
1. If β > δ, type 0 dies out (i.e. P (lim t→∞ X t (u) = 1) = 1 for all u ∈ V ).
2. If δ > β, type 1 dies out (i.e. P (lim t→∞ X t (u) = 0) = 1 for all u ∈ V ).
Lemma 5.3 (cVMBC≤biased voter model). Let X be a cVMBC with bias α and cooperation coefficient γ and X a biased voter model with bias γ and α. Then, if b(., (., .) ) satisfies Proof. We need to show (see [Lig85, Theorem 3 
We start with the first assertion and write
and for the second inequality we have
This finishes the proof.
Next, we focus on the aVMBC in the case V = Z d and the symmetric, nearest-neighbor random walk kernel.
Lemma 5.4 (aVMBC≤biased voter model). Let V = Z d , a(., .) be the nearest-neighbor random walk kernel defined in equation (3.3), X be an aVMBC with bias α and cooperation coefficient γ and X a biased voter model with bias γ(2d − 1)/(2d) and α + γ/(2d). Then, if X 0 ≤ X 0 , it is possible to couple X and X such that X t ≤ X t for all t ≥ 0.
Proof. Again, we need to show that for X ≤ X the inequalities in (5.1) hold. We start with the first assertion and write by using that X(u) = 0
and for the second inequality, now using X(u) = 1 we have
This yields the statement.
A result on a jump process
In the proof of Theorem 1, we will use the dynamics of the size of a cluster of cooperators and rely on a comparison of this clustersize process with a certain jump process (which jumps downward by at most one and upwards by at most two). The following Proposition will be needed.
Proposition 5.5 (A jump process). Let (µ(t)) t≥0 , (λ 1 (t)) t≥0 , (λ 2 (t)) t≥0 be R + -valued càdlàg-stochastic processes, adapted to some filtration (F t ) t≥0 , which satisfy λ 1 (t) + 2λ 2 (t) − µ(t) > ε > 0 for some ε and
In addition, let (C t ) t≥0 be a Z-valued (F t ) t≥0 -Markov-jump-process, which jumps at time t from x to
x − 1 at rate µ(t),
x + 1 at rate λ 1 (t),
x + 2 at rate λ 2 (t)
Then, Proof. In the case of time-homogeneous rates, i.e. constant µ, λ 1 and λ 2 , the assertion is an immediate consequence of the law of large numbers. We prove the general case by using martingale theory. We assume without loss of generality that λ 1 (t) + λ 2 (t) + µ(t) = 1 for all t ≥ 0. (Otherwise, we use a time-rescaling. Note that this rescaling is bounded by assumption (5.2) and therefore, C t t→∞ − −− → ∞ holds iff it holds for the rescaled process.) We first show that there exists a c > 0 such that for all a ∈ (0, a c ), the process (exp(−aC t )) t≥0 is a positive (F t ) t≥0 -super-martingale. For this, consider the (time-dependent) generator of the process (C t ) t≥0 applied to the function f (x) = exp(−ax) which yields at time t
for g t (a) := λ 1 (t) exp(−a) + λ 2 (t) exp(−2a) + µ(t) exp(a) − 1. Noting that for all t, we have that g t (0) = 0 and ∂g t ∂a (0) = −λ 1 (t) − 2λ 2 (t) + µ(t) < −ε by (5.2), we find a c > 0 such that g t (a) < 0 for all 0 < a < a c and all t ≥ 0, which means that (exp(−aC t )) t≥0 is an (F t ) t≥0 -super-martingale. By the martingale convergence theorem, it converges almost surely and -since the sum of rates is bounded away from 0 -the only possible almost sure limit is 0. Now, 
Proofs
Here, we will show our main results.
Proof of Theorem 1
For (i), we have α > γ. The assertion is a consequence of the coupling with the biased voter model from Lemma 5.3 (with bias γ and α). Since the biased voter model dominates the cVMBC and type 1 dies out in the biased voter model (5.2), the same is true for the cVMBC.
The proof of (ii) is more involved. We have to show that cooperators survive almost surely when started in a non-trivial translation invariant configuration. Therefore, we analyze an arbitrary cluster of cooperators and show that the size of such a cluster has a positive probability to diverge off to infinity. Note that the flanking regions of a cluster of cooperators can have three different forms: These are the only possible environments a cluster of cooperators can encounter in one dimension. Note that a cluster can also only consist of a single cooperator. The dynamics of the cluster size depends on the environment. Precisely, by the dynamics of the process, we obtain the following. A cluster of size x > 1 in case A jumps to y = x + 1 at rate 1 + γ jumps to y = x − 1 at rate 1 + α in case B jumps to y ≥ x + 2 at rate at least 2 + γ jumps to y = x − 1 at rate 1 + α + γ in case C jumps to y ≥ x + 2 at rate at least 1 + γ 2 jumps to y = x + 1 at rate 1+γ 2 jumps to y = x − 1 at rate 1 + α + γ 2 .
(6.1)
Under the assumptions of Theorem 1, let (V t ) t≥0 be a stochastic process representing the cluster of cooperators which is closest to the origin and contains at least two cooperators. (If there is no such cluster at time 0, wait for some time ε > 0 and pick the cluster then.) We will show that
since then -by translation invariance -every configuration carrying both types has vanishing probability for t → ∞.
We start with the dynamics of p t (1), which reads (recall that α = γ) (ii) For d = 1 and the nearest neighbor random walk, the altruistic mechanism is such that a configuration 01 (or 10) turns into 00 at rate α/2 + γ/4. The same holds for the cVMBC with selection rate α + γ/2. In addition, 110 (or 011) turns to 111 at rate γ/2, which is the same as for the cVMBC with cooperation parameter γ. This shows that the transition rates for the altruistic process 3. As just argued in 1. and 2. if N t t→∞ − −− → 1 the remaining finite cluster must contain the stronger type, i.e. defectors for α > γ and cooperators for γ > α. The size of the remaining finite cluster therefore is a biased random walk which goes to infinity on {N t t→∞ − −− → 1} and the result follows.
